Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 11

1-1-2001

The Evolving Treatment of Garden-Variety Claims under the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Ryan M. Gott
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
6 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 91 (2001)

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

THE EVOLVING TREATMENT OF "GARDENVARIETY" CLAIMS UNDER THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Jaffee v.
Redmond,' an absolute privilege exists at federal common law regarding
the psychotherapist-patient relationship. 2 This new privilege arose with
the guidance and mandate of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 3
In Jaffe, Supreme Court Justice Stevens related the psychotherapist-patient
privilege to similar absolute privileges arising in professional relationships
that require trust and confidence to maintain, and which the public has an
interest in protecting. 4

' 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
2See id.
3 See id. at 8-10 (analyzing history of federal common law). The Senate reported

that after the adoption of Rule 501 any changes to the rule "should be determined on a caseby-case basis." Id. at 8 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 13 (1974)). n outlining the need to
attain effective psychotherapy, Justice Stevens stated that an atmosphere of confidence and
trust was required in an effort to achieve complete disclosure. Id. at 10. In contrast, the
doctor-patient relationship is not recognized under federal privilege law. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at
10. A psychologist's ability to give medical assistance is premised on complete verbal
disclosure of ailments, unlike traditional diagnostic tests and physical examinations used by
doctors. Id. See generally Jennifer Sawyer Klien, "I'm Your Therapist, You Can Tell Me
Anything": The Supreme Court Confirms The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in Jaffee v.
Redmond, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 701 (Spring 1998) (analyzing reasons for new privilege);
Gayle Nicole Mapp, Jaffee v. Redmond: Supreme Court Recognition of Protected Psychotherapist Privilege, 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 679 (Spring 1997) (providing justifications and
legislative history of new privilege).
4 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (relating spousal and attorney-client privileges). The
possibility of disclosure would most likely impair the development of this special relationship. Id. at 10 (citing studies discussed by American Psychiatric Association).
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This evidentiary privilege prevents disclosures of psychological records, notes and/or testimony regarding conversations between a psychotherapist and a patient.5 Like many other testimonial privileges, only the
privilege holder can waive the privilege. 6 The Jaffe Court, however, refused to establish clear guidelines to assist the lower courts in exploring
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.7 The Court's failure to outline the
full contours of the privilege has lead to mixed determinations in the lower
courts of when a patient waives his rights to it.8
Part II of this note will briefly review the Jaffee v. Redmond decision. Part III will continue with a discussion of subsequent leading cases
illustrating the broad and narrow interpretations when a patient waives the
privilege. Part IV explores the waiver analysis when considering "gardenvariety" claims. Part V analyzes the response and impact of the broad and
narrow view of waiver, including how those views apply to garden-variety
claims. Part VI concludes that patients should not be found to have
waived the privilege when raising garden-variety claims.
II. CREATION OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In 1975, Congress rejected nine specific privileges recommended
by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, deciding
instead in favor of an open-ended Rule 501.9 Traditionally, the Court construed privileges quite narrowly and refused to expand the privileges

5 See Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (comment-

ing on effect of Jaffee decision). This is in direct conflict with the general rule that "the
public...has a right to every man's evidence." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Please note that this article does not explore the qualification procedures examined to determine if a doctor, social worker, or caregiver is held to the requirements of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 20-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the validity of a
social worker being covered under the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
6 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at n. 14 (stating patient can waive protection).
7 See id. at n. 19 (recognizing possible future limited exceptions to rule).

8 See infra note 24 (noting narrow and broad interpretations of waiver analysis exist
in different jurisdictions).
9 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14-15. Of those nine rules, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was one of them. Id. at 16. The failure to include the privilege did not mean the
committee disapproved of the recognition of a psychiatrist-patient privilege. Id. at 15 (reviewing Senate Judiciary Committee notes). Rule 501 states in part "Except as otherwise
required...the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. at n.3.
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granted under Rule 501. l' Despite this trend, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Jaffee case after the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Federal Rule
501.''
The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jaffe,
thereby recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 2 The facts of the
case are as follows: on June 27, 1991, the respondent, Mary Lu Redmond
(Officer Redmond), a police officer for the Village of Hoffman Estates,

responded to a fight in progress.13 When Officer Redmond arrived at the
scene, she witnessed Mr. Allen chasing a third-party with a knife.14 When
Mr. Allen did not respond to Officer Redmond's demand to stop, she shot
and killed him. 15
Afterwards, Officer Redmond visited a social worker to discuss the
event. The administrator of Mr. Allen's estate requested the notes of the
16

conversation between the social worker and respondent during pre-trial
discovery and again at trial.1'

Officer Redmond and the social worker

refused to comply, which contributed to an unfavorable result in the case
and a subsequent appeal.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

reversed the trial court, causing the administrator of Mr. Allen's estate to
petition the Supreme Court. 19 In rejecting the administrator's arguments,
10See id. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing rule as "new, vast and ill defined").
I See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6 (citing reason and experience by court of appeals for acceptance of this new privilege). The court of appeals recognized the psychotherapistpatient privilege as a qualified privilege noting that a presiding justice could pierce the
privilege through a balancing test. Id. at 7 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1357
(7th Cir. 1995)).
'2 Id. at 6.
13Id.
14Id.

" Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4.
16 Id. at 5. Officer Redmond consulted with Karen Beyer, a clinical social worker at
about fifty counseling sessions. Id.
17Id.
18Id. at 5-6. Officer Redmond and her social worker either refused to answer or professed an inability to recollect details of the event. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 6. The presiding
justice stated that the refusal to turn over the notes was not based on a legal foundation and
therefore, the jury could assume it would harm respondent. Id The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision and recognized that a privilege existed. Id. at 6.
19See id. at 7-8 (finding evidentiary need did not outweigh confidential
conversation). The court of appeals found that "reason and experience" allowed for the recognition
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501. Id. at 6 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond,
51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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the Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege for
similar reasons as the Court of Appeals, but disagreed with that Court's
finding that the privilege would be subject to a balancing test. z0
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
"The real issue here is not whether the privilege exists but rather
whether [the] plaintiffhas waived that privilege.,,21
When the Supreme Court created a new evidentiary privilege between psychotherapists and their patients, it gave little guidance as to its
parameters.-- Over the past four years, caselaw has developed on the issue
when a patient waives the privilege.- Most of those cases can be divided
20 See

Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10, 17-18 (noting possibility of disclosure may destroy con-

fidential relationship). The Court rejected the balancing test because the promise made by
a psychotherapist on confidentiality may be contingent on a trial judges subsequent determination, which would destroy the purpose of the privilege. Id. at 17. See generall Klien,
supra note 3 (providing other reasons for Court's decision to approve new privilege).
21 See Kerman v. New York, 1997 WL 666261. at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997).
22 See Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 526 (N.D. II. 1999) (citing Supreme Court's purposeful intent not to establish "full contours" of privilege). The Court
refused to determine the full effects of the privilege in a way that would "govern all conceivable future questions in this area." Jaftee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn v. United
States, 449 U.S. at 386 (1981)). The Supreme Court gave one example of waiver, "if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist." Id. at n.19. Furthermore, the Court rejected the balancing approach
that the court of appeals implemented. Supra note 20 and accompanying text (believing
subjective disclosure would destroy relationship). The Court stated that the patient "must
be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. at 393
(1981)). The Court did recognize that the privilege could be waived similar to the attorneyclient and spousal privilege. Id. at 10, n. 14. The psychotherapist-patient privilege tends to
be more closely associated with the attorney-client privilege. Kamper v. Gray, 182 F.R.D.
597, n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting attorney-client privilege not existent when third parties
informed, same true with psychotherapist-patient); EEOC v. Danka Industries, Inc., 990 F.
Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (citing Sarko v. Penn Del Directory, 170 F.R.D.
127,130 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (showing attorney-client privilege waived when advise of counsel
placed at issue in litigation); Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 528 (noting Jqffee analysis of attorneyclient privilege); Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997)
(commenting on waiver of attorney-client privilege).
23See Booker v. City of Boston, 1999 WL 734644, at *I (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999)
(detailing jurisdictions that have ruled differently on issue of waiver); see also itnfra note 24
(detailing two categories of waiver analysis).
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into two categories: 1) broad interpretation and 2) narrow interpretation, of
when a patient has waived the privilege.24 Of those categories, the two
most widely discussed cases are Sarko v. Peen-Del Directory Co. (broad
interpretation) and Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark (narrow
interpretation). 25
In Sarko, the defendant fired the claimant for being excessively late
to work. 26 The employee claimed that she suffered from clinical depression that required medication, which the defendant knew about. 27 In order
to defend against the employee's ADA claim, the defendant wanted to

review certain medical records that were in the custody of the employee's
primary psychiatrist. 28 The Sarko court needed to determine if the employee waived her protection under the psychotherapist-patient privilege
when she alleged these types of damages in her complaint. 29 The court

3
found that the claimant waived the privilege for three separate reasons. 0
First, prior state law had recognized a waiver in these types of situations.3'

Second, the Supreme Court, in Jaffee, analogized the psychotherapistpatient privilege with the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney-client

24 Compare Broad interpretation: McKenna v. Cruz, 1998 WL 809533, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998); Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 562 (S.D. Cal.
1999); Sidor v. Reno, 1998 WL 164823, at * I (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 1998); Danka Industries,
Inc., 990 F. Supp. at 1138; Fox v. The Gates Corp., 179 F.R.D. 303, 303 (D. Colo. 1998);
Kerman v. City of New York, 1997 WL 666261, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1997); Doolittle
v. Ruffo, 1997 WL 151799, at * 1 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 1997) with narrow interpretation:
Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2000);
Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 526; Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 225; Booker, 1999 WL 734644, at * 1;
Allen v. Cook County Sheriffs Dept., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3587, at * I (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17,
1999); see also Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152,152 (Colo. 1999) (reasoning along same
lines as Jaffee). But see Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 1999 WL 635449, at * I (N.D. Ill. Aug.
19, 1999) (declining to follow either approach); Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1999), modified by Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (allowing waiver under broad interpretation but limiting discovery to relevant emotional condition).
25See, e.g., Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 621, 624; McKenna, 1998 WL 809533, at * 2. 3;
Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 526 (recognizing Sarko and Vanderbilt as split on application of
psychotherapist-patient privilege).
26 Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 129.
27 Id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant employer violated the Age Discrimi-

nation Act, Title VII, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id.
28

Id.

29 See id. at 130.
30
See Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130.
31 See id. (citing recent state cases that recognized a privilege with a possibility of
waiver).
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privilege is waived when advice from counsel is placed at issue. 2 Finally,
the Court held that, in the interests of judicial fairness, the plaintiff should
not be allowed to use the privilege as a sword and a shield. 33 Additionally,
the Court reasoned that the plaintiff would have to prove the ADA claim
with the help of her psychiatrist. 34 For the above reasons, the35Court required the plaintiff to produce her treating psychiatrist's records.
In Vanderbilt, the plaintiff alleged various claims of discrimination
and sought damages for emotional distress.36 In response, the defendant
requested all psychiatric and psychotherapeutic records from the plaintiffs
doctors.3 7 The defendant relied on various court decisions, including
Sarko,
that supported waiver when a patient puts her "mental state at is38
'

sue."

First, the court found that the "no balancing" instruction in Jaffee
changed the waiver analysis previously found under state law.39 Second,
although the court agreed with Sarko's use of the attorney-client analogy,
4
it decided that Sarko's application of the privilege had been improper. 0
32See id. Similarly, the court predicted that under Pennsylvania law the psychotherapist-patient privilege would be waived like the attorney-client privilege. Id.
33See id. (suggesting allowance of privilege would be contrary to fairness and justice).
See Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130 (noting that an ADA claim requires physical or
mental impairment and record of such impairment).
31See id. at 129.
36 Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 226 (D. Mass. 1997).
37Id.
38 Id.

at 228 (citing Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 708-

09 (D. Md. 1997); Doolittle v. Ruffo, 1997 WL 151799, at * 2 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 1997);
Sarko, 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997)). The court examined those cases applying
waiver when the claimant placed their mental state at issue. Id. Of those cases, the court
found three common themes: 1) many rulings were pre-Jaffee and found waiver when a
claimant put there mental state at issue; 2) Waiver to the attorney-client privilege was
similar to this privilege; and 3) that it would be unfair in the interests of justice to enforce
the privilege. Id.
39See id. at 229. By making an emotional claim the privilege is not waived but is
now potentially relevant. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229. Privileged information is usually
highly relevant. Id. (referring to attorney-client analogy in Sax v. Sax, 136 F.R.D. 541, 542
(D. Mass. 1991)).
40See id. (noting the privileges should be analogous following the direction from the
Supreme Court). In an attorney-client relationship, the client waives the privilege when he
sues his attorney for malpractice or when his defense is based on the advice from the attorney. Id The client however, does not waive that privilege if he is solely seeking attorney
fees. Id. Similarly, a client that sues his psychotherapist or relies on his psychotherapists
advice has waived the privilege. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229. However, if only a communication took place then a subsequent emotional distress claim does not automatically
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Lastly, the Court held that a judicial sense of fair play and justice were not
compromised in the case because the plaintiff did not use the substance of
the communications as evidence, and therefore, did not use the privilege as
a "shield and a sword."' 4 1 In the court's conclusion, it noted that there are a
number of ways to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege but that the
plaintiff had not qualified for any of them.4 2
IV. WAIVER BY PRIVILEGE HOLDER FOR "GARDEN-VARIETY"
CLAIMS
"An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely43varying applicationsby the courts, is little better then no
privilege at all.
The majority of cases follow the Sarko philosophy. 44 Recently,
however, many jurisdictions have been following both the narrow interpretation of Vanderbilt and the practical garden-variety synthesis. 45 Garden-variety claims, also known as generic or incidental claims, appear to
fall in line with the narrow interpretation outlined in Vanderbilt.46 Gardendissolve the privilege. Id.
41See id. at 230 (realizing in this case plaintiff did not introduce her therapy records).
42 See id. at 228 (recognizing dates of treatment have no privilege but substance is
protected). To waive the privilege, the claimant could do so explicitly or could waive it
through disclosure of privileged material. Id. The court felt that the plaintiff did not waive
the privilege because she had not divulged or planned to divulge any of the privileged
communications as evidence. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 228. The court recognized that if
the plaintiff had called her psychotherapist or testified as to the communications, then the
privilege would have been waived. Id. at 230.
43Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
44See Sidor v. Reno, 1998 WL 164823, at n.3 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 1998) (commenting that Kerman approach, which followed Sarko, representing majority view); Vanderbilt,
174 F.R.D. at 228 (stating courts have held waiver solely by placing mental state at issue).
45See Ruhlmann v. Uster County Dep't of Soc. Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 451
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing "garden-variety" claim under narrow analysis); Sorenson v.
H&R Block, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 199, 199 (D. Mass. 2000) (decideing state issue on "gardenvariety" analysis); Booker v. City of Boston, 1999 WL 734644, at*1 (D. Mass. Sept. 10,
1999) (basing decision on narrow interpretation of Vanderbilt); Allen v. Cook County
Sheriff's Dept., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3587, at*l (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1999) (stating narrow view
acceptable); see also Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 529 (N.D. 111.1999) (focusing on in-depth attorney-client waiver analysis relating to Jaffee decision).
46 See Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 450
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (associating narrow view with "garden-variety" claims).
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variety claims represent emotional distress claims which are considered
usual or simple. 47 Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Services, explores the reasons for the current judicial application of a narrow waiver
analysis for garden-variety claims.4 8
In Ruhlmann, the plaintiff was a former county employee with the
Department of Social Services. 49 Ruhlmann was involuntarily placed in a
mental institution following allegations that he made threats to other employees. 50 As a result, disciplinary charges were filed against Ruhlmann,
which ultimately led to his resignation.51 In response, Ruhlmann filed a
lawsuit claiming multiple violations of federal and state law, as well as
damages for mental and emotional suffering.52
Based on Ruhlmann's claim for mental and emotional suffering,
the defendant requested Ruhlmann's medical and psychiatric files from the
previous five years.53 The magistrate judge allowed such discovery and
Ruhlmann appealed the decision.54 Ruhlmann sought to protect his past
psychiatric records, stating that his emotional condition was not at issue
merely because he was seeking relief for emotional damages.55
In reviewing the issue, the court noted the split amongst the courts
on the issue of waiver. 56 Ruhlmann advocated the use of the narrow interpretation, finding waiver only when a plaintiff affirmatively asserts his
mental condition. 57 The defendants, however, advocated a broad interpretation, finding waiver when a plaintiff seeks any emotional damage, sub47 See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at n.6. "Garden-variety" is defined as ordinary or
commonplace. Id. (citing Webster's NEW WORLD DIcrIONARY 656 (3d ed. College ed.

1988)). The Colorado Supreme Court, in an analogous evidentiary decision, noted that a
"garden-variety" claim should not constitute waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because the emotional condition of a claimant may only be "peripherally involved" therefore, providing no justification for waiver. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo.
1999).
48 See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 450-51.
The court looked at the Supreme Court's
decision in Jaffee as well as other courts' decisions that utilize a broader view of waiver. Id.
49 Id. at 447.
50 Id.
51

52
53

Id.
Id.
Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 447.

54 Id. This issue of waiver under the psychotherapist-patient privilege had not been
decisively reconciled by the second circuit after Jaffee. Id. at 448.
55 See id. at 448.

6 See id. at 44849.
Id. at 448.

57
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jecting all psychiatric records to the discovery process.5 8
In reviewing the contending cases, the court recognized that many
of the cases supporting a broad interpretation appeared to exclude gardenvariety claims when deliberating issues of waiver. 59 The court further
noted that such disclosure for incidental claims would be inconsistent with
the intended purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 60 For the
aforementioned reasons, the court held that Ruhlmann's garden-variety
claim was protected under the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 6'
Massachusetts courts have found that garden-variety claims are
protected by statute under the psychotherapist-patient privilege.62 The
requirements that must be satisfied under the Massachusetts statute to trigger the psychotherapist-patient privilege are very similar to those ex-

58

Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 449.

59 See id. The court reviewed three broad interpretation cases to support this view: 1)

Jackson v. Chubb Corp:, 193 F.R.D. 216, 225-26 (D. N.J. 2000), the plaintiff alleged
"anxiety, paranoia, depression and hallucinations;" 2) McKenna v. Cruz, 1998 WL 80953,
at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998), the plaintiff alleged "serious and possibly permanent
emotional injuries;" and 3) Doolittle v. Ruffo, 1997 WL 151799, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
1997), the plaintiff alleged "debilitating depression" preventing her from returning to work.
Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 449. In all these cases, the plaintiff was denied a psychotherapistpatient privilege because the damages sought were not just incidental or "garden-variety."
Id. Some cases, however, did not make such a distinction. Id. at 450 (citing Fox v. Gates
Corp., 179 F.R.D. at 306 (D. Colo. 1998)) (finding waiver whenever emotion damage is
sought); EEOC v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. at 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (finding
waiver with emotional damage claim); Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp., 1997 WL
597905, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (finding plaintiffs attempt to limit testimony still
results in waiver).
60 See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 451. The court felt that the mere seeking of emotional distress for "garden-variety" claims would be incompatible with the purpose of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id.
61See id. at 450. The court seemed to accept the view in Vanderbilt that Ruhlmann's
privacy right should be protected providing he did not bring in any impermissible witnesses
or use his treatment as part of his case. Id. A plaintiff does not automatically waive his
privilege just by placing his emotional or mental condition at issue, providing he is seeking
just "garden-variety" damages. Id. at 451.
62See Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., LEXIS 16250, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2000).
In diversity actions, unlike federal questions, the federal court utilizes state law to determine the waiver of privileges. Id. at 8. Massachusetts statute provides similar protection for
the psychotherapist-patient relationship as set forth in Jaffee, even though a balancing test
may be utilized by the presiding justice. MASS. GEN. LAws. ch. 233, § 20B (2000). The
issue of waiver concerning such privilege has been addressed by Massachusetts courts on
occasion. See generally, Sabree v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners, 126 F.R.D. 422,
426 (D. Mass. 1989) (noting a "garden-variety" claim does not place mental condition at
issue).
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pressed in Jaffee.63 In Sorenson v. H&R Block, the defendants released the
plaintiffs' tax information to the IRS, resulting in a criminal and civil investigation. 64 In response, the plaintiffs sought damages under state law
including monetary compensation for mental anguish, severe emotional
distress, humiliation, personal indignity, emotional pain, embarrassment
and anxiety.6 5
The court in Sorenson found that Massachusetts consistently applied a narrow interpretation of waiver. 66 The cases suggested that mental
or psychological injury requiring expert testimony in order to prove the
plaintiff's case should be considered waived while, in the alternative, garden-variety emotional distress, not requiring expert testimony, should not
waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege.67 Delineating the contours of
the garden-variety exception, the court noted that the plaintiff cannot try to
offer testimony of a psychotherapist, introduce records of treatment at trial
or try to introduce the substance of any communications with psychotherapists without waiving the privilege.68 Moreover, the court supported its
finding by listing other federal privilege law cases which followed the
Supreme Court ruling in Jaffee.69

63 See Donovan v. Prussman, LEXIS 403, 19-20 (Mass. Super. Aug. 1, 2000) (rec-

ognizing federal and state privilege law are different because of state exemptions). See cf
Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 153 (holding generic claims are outside scope of statute).
64 See Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., LEXIS 16250, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2000).
65

Id.

See id. at 11-12. A request for damages regarding emotional injury in Massachusetts does not always result in waiver unless it requires psychiatric treatment. Id. at 11-12
(citing Perrin v. S&A Enterprises, 1999 WL 1327665, at *1 (Mass. Super. Feb. 16, 1999);
Myers v. Tom Foolery's Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 592 (Mass. Super. 1999); Kippenhan v.
Chaulk Services, Inc., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 121 at n.1 (Mass.Super. 1994); McCue v. Draines, I
Mass. L. Rptr. 298 (Mass. Super. 1993); Boremi v. Lechmere, Inc., 1993 WL 818581, at
n.3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 22, 1993)).
67 See id. at 14.
66

See id. at 15. Moreover, the court noted that even a claim of loss of consortium,
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress does not automatically waive the
privilege. Id. (citing Myers v. Tom Foolery's Inc., 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 592 (Mass. Super.
1999) and McCue v. Kraines, I Mass. L. Rptr. 298 (Mass. Super. 1993)).
69 See Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., LEXIS 16250, at *14 (D. Mass. Nov. 2,
2000)
(recognizing recent opinions of Booker and Vanderbilt under federal psychotherapistpatient privilege law).
69
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V. ANALYSIS
"By creatingan evidentiaryprivilege, societ , has made a judgment
thatfostering certain ideas or relationshipsis worth the potential sacrifice
involved in terms of the loss of relevant evidence. ,70
The Supreme Court's recognition of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was a major advancement in the area of evidentiary privilege
law. 7' The Court, however, refused to define the parameters of the privilege, leaving the lower courts to consider the details.72 Understandably,
the issue of waiver has created split decisions that have yet to be reconciled, including the status of waiver regarding garden-variety claims.73
Soon after the Jaffee decision, the majority of courts recognized
that any claim of emotional distress was sufficient to place one's emotional condition at issue in the litigation, resulting in the waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.74 Under this view, waiver would result
when a plaintiff makes any claim for emotional distress or pain and suffering, regardless of the severity of the injury.75 Federal and state courts
are increasingly finding that the mere claim of emotional distress should
not be the sole basis of waiver.76 Vanderbilt has been a leader in defining
this stricter approach to the waiver analysis.7 7 The narrow analysis, promulgated by Vanderbilt and its progeny, provides for waiver if the claimant:
1) planned to use privileged conversations as evidence of harm, or 2)
planned to use a psychotherapist as evidence to prove damages. 78 This
70 Fritsch

v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1999).

71 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (recognizing psychotherapist-patient

privilege originally rejected as an absolute privilege in favor of Rule 501); supra note 5
(realizing a conflict with general rules of evidence).
72See supra note 21 and accompanying text (examining refusal by judiciary to define parameters of privilege).
73See supra note 24 (noting spit in judiciary on waiver).
74See supra note 44 (recognizing majority view on waiver analysis).
75See Booker v. City of Boston, 1999 WL 734644, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 1999)
(noting a mere assertion of a claim for emotional distress results in waiver).
76See supra note 42 and accompanying text (claiming emotional damage makes
privilege "potentially relevant" but not waived); see also supra note 46 (recognizing "garden-variety" claims).
77See EEOC v. Danka Industries, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
(recognizing Vanderbilt for narrow view); Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526,
528 (N.D. Il. 1999) (noting narrow view of Vanderbilt).
78See Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista. 187 F.R.D. 614, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1999), modified
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permits a plaintiff to make a claim of emotional damage but limits the
depth in which he can disclose that damage without waiving the privilege.
Moreover, Vanderbilt's two-step analysis would likely have been sufficient to find that a waiver existed in many previous court decisions utilizing the Sarko analysis of waiver.79
Ruhlmann and others have further analyzed this approach by applying the issue of waiver to garden-variety claims. Under the majority
view, an attempt to make a garden-variety claim is sufficient for finding
waiver of the privilege.80 Ruhlmann's refusal to rely on this type of waiver
analysis, with such a low threshold, is based on increasing support for that
proposition within the judiciary. 8 1
Of the many concerns the Sarko court expressed, one of them was a
concern that the privilege should not be used as a shield and a sword.82
This idea stands for the proposition that a plaintiff might use evidence of
treatment or damage to further their claims but would then shield further
disclosure by claiming privilege. 83 This idea is similarly embraced by the
Vanderbilt court. 84 Under Vanderbilt, a plaintiff would not be allowed to
use a psychotherapist to testify concerning treatment or damages, and
85
could not refer to those conversations, without waiving his privilege.
Ruhlmann, like Vanderbilt, also expresses that a privilege should not be
used in such a manner.8 6 Ruhlmann's analysis attempts to show that judiby Doe v. City of ChUla Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (examining standard utilized in Vanderhilt); see also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (providing detail for
waiver analysis by Vanderbilt court).
79 See Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, n. 3 (N.D. 111.1999) (recognizing situations that would be waived under narrow analysis of psychotherapist-patient privilege).
8oSee supra note 44 (recognizing majority find waiver by solely placing mental state
at issue); McKenna v. Cruz, 1998 WL 908533, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (noting an
unwillingness to distinguish a "garden-variety" claim).
91See supra note 45 (noting recent cases following Vanderbilt and Ruhlmann analysis).
82See supra note 33 (noting concern with judicial fairness).
83See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229-30 (D. Mass. 1997).
84 See supra note 41 (recognizing plaintiff did not use communications to undermine

judicial fairness standard sought by Sarko); see also Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187
F.R.D. 614, 624 (S.D. Cal. 1999), modified by Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562
(S.D. Cal. 1999) (noting plaintiffs in Sidor, McKenna, Danka, Doolittle and Vann all
would have waived privilege).
85 See Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 230.
86 See Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't of Soc. Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 448
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing cases which require plaintiff to affirmatively use his mental condition to waive privilege).
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cial fairness is preserved regarding "garden-variety" claims because a
plaintiff claiming 87
such injuries cannot use a psychotherapist at trial or refer
to such treatment.
Vanderbilt and Sarko both hold that a waiver analysis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege would be similar to that used in an attorneyclient setting; however, both courts apply the privilege differently. 88 The
Sarko court found waiver to exist when any communications between a
doctor and patient are at issue in the litigation. 89 On the other hand, Vanderbilt adopted a higher standard concerning this relationship. 9° Waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is more appropriate when a claimant
relies on the a psychotherapist's actual findings or discussions with a patient, just as a client waives his attorney-client privilege if he relies on an
attorney's advice and then subsequently sues that attorney concerning such
advice. 9' Although this analysis is merely mentioned in Ruhlmann, it is
unlikely that a garden-variety case would waive the psychotherapistpatient privilege. 92 Unlike an ongoing illness or serious emotional injury,
a garden-variety case would not rely on the findings or discussions between a patient and his psychotherapist for its success.93

Public policy dictates that garden-variety claims should not be sufficient to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 94 Garden-variety
claims are commonplace damages that represent normal pain and suffering
that an individual receives, typically through no fault of their own. 95 Furthermore, garden-variety emotional suffering is a natural result of many

See id. at 450 (presenting Vanderbilt analysis to demonstrate judicial fairness).
88 See supra notes 32, 40 (suggesting reasons for attorney-client analogy); see also
97

supra note 4 (relating privilege to spousal and attorney-client relationship). Waiver of
attorney-client privilege is not based on the clients state of mind but on the attorney's advice. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 529 (N.D. I11.1999).
89
See Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory, 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
90 See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997).
91 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (relating Vanderbilt interpretation of
attorney-client privilege). The attorney-client relationship is put at issue if the client makes
a claim or defense that requires disclosure to rebut such claim. Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 529
(citing Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).
92 See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 450 (explaining Vanderbilt analysis of privilege).
93 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (showing cases that required a physician
due to the severity of the injuries).
94 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. (accepting narrow view when no impermissible witnesses or treatments are utilized).
95 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (defining term and noting an emotional
condition of a plaintiff as being peripherally involved).
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accidents, and does not require physician testimony to establish damages. 96
The nature of such emotional injuries does not warrant a breach of confidence between a physician and his patient. 97 It is counterintuitive that
therapy, previously obtained in confidence for unrelated issues, should be
subject to disclosure in a subsequent unrelated trial. 98 Ruhlmann seeks to
uphold compensation claims for such injuries without the intrusion into a
claimants therapeutical history. 99 Ruhlmann, however, recognizes that
these damages, by definition, are extremely limited.'00 If a plaintiff seeks
greater compensation by claiming extensive injury or seeks the testimony
of a treatment provider, he will waive the privilege. By seeking compensation for an extensive injury, a waiver of the privilege would have to occur because: 1)the plaintiff violated the two-prong analysis of Vanderbilt;
and 2) his injury proved to be more then garden-variety. 101
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's reasoning in Ruhlmann and Vanderbilt allows for a
higher standard when considering the issue when a patient waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege. While the Sarko majority provides a bright
line rule, the standard for the rule is too low. Automatic waiver of the
privilege for merely experiencing commonplace damages is not based on
the original purpose behind establishing the privilege. Garden-variety
claims represent commonplace damages that do not require the testimony
of a physician. These damages are limited and not extensive. Evidentiary
96See Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999). In an analogous argument by the Colorado supreme court, "garden-variety" claims would not waive the privilege if they are "bare allegations of mental anguish, emotional distress, pain and suffering..." Id.
97See Fritsch v. City of Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 628 (S.D. Cal. 1999), modified

by Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Johnson, 977 P.2d
at 158).
98 See id.This type of disclosure would "degrade the privileges and undermine the
public policy of preserving confidence that they were designed to implement." Id.
99See Ruhlmann, 194 F.R.D. at 451 (basing rule on established parameters of privilege law). "Garden-variety" emotional distress is simple or usual and not complex. Id. at
n.6.
100 See id. at 450 (holding plaintiff can protect privilege if damages are incidental).
Furthermore, when considering the extent of generic claims under Massachusetts state law,
this type of emotion claim is limited. Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc., LEXIS 16250, at *13-4
(D. Mass. Nov. 2, 2000) (noting that claims cannot include psychic damage).
101See supra note 42 and accompanying text (recognizing different methods to
waive privilege under narrow analysis).
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proof of commonplace damages does not require the treatment or testimony of a physician. Furthermore, Vanderbilt provides a narrow two-step
analysis that can assist in determining whether a claimant is suing for more
then just garden-variety damages.
The Supreme Court attempted to limit an overly broad interpretation
of waiver by stating that, "the participants in a confidential conversation
must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected." Furthermore, the Supreme Court only expressed waiver by delineating extreme cases, whereas the waiver analysis
in Sarko and its progeny would result in a common waiver exception,
giving insufficient weight to an absolute privilege. The public's perception of the psychotherapist-patient privilege would most likely change if
such a privilege could be waived whenever a claim for emotional health
was at issue. This would result in an ineffective privilege and an unhealthy public. Providing a holder of the privilege does not use a privileged conversation to prove damages or harm, it is in the public interest
ensure that the psychotherapist-patient privilege remains inviolate.
Ryan M. Gott

